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THE FALL AND RISE OF THE EXIT CONSENT
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ABSTRACT
Bond issuers wanting to restructure their distressed debt often
propose an exchange offer, in which the issuer persuades its
bondholders to swap their present holdings for new bonds capable of
being honored. To guard against nonparticipating bondholders,
issuers may pair their exchange offers with an exit consent. A use of a
bond’s modification clause, an exit consent is a technique by which
bondholders participating in the exchange also vote to impair the
distressed bonds.
Use of the exit consent raises a contract question about the duty of
good faith and fair dealing. For a quarter of a century, exit consents
survived judicial scrutiny when they followed the Delaware case Katz
v. Oak Industries Inc. Then, in a case emblematic of the recent
Eurozone economic crisis, Assénagon Asset Management v. Irish
Bank Resolution Corp., an English court found that the exit consent
breached this doctrinal duty, seemingly upending Katz’s position as
the seminal case on exit consents. This Note argues that such concern
is misplaced, concluding that Assénagon augments but does not
replace Katz. It proposes reconciling the two cases in a manner that
upholds the common values of each case in an effort to provide stable
legal principles amid markets in flux.
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If you have a 50 Dollar debt, you’re called a scrounger. . . .
Having a 50 million Dollar debt means you’re a financial genius.
And only a government can have a 50 billion Dollar debt.
1

– Anonymous

INTRODUCTION
2

3

The year 2008 infamously saw many insolvent household and
4
corporate borrowers. Yet even in the year of “fundamental . . .
changes in business paradigms and the spectacular self-destruction of
5
storied institutions,” few insolvencies threatened as many
paradigms—or were nearly as spectacular—as that of Anglo Irish
Bank (Anglo Irish). Barely one year after posting record profits of
6
€1.2 billion, Anglo Irish disclosed heavy losses from investments in
commercial real estate, subprime residential mortgages, and collapsed
7
American and Icelandic banks. Because of Anglo Irish’s importance
8
to the Irish economy, the bank’s financial tailspin “hurried the
9
government into action,” first, to guarantee the bank’s most
10
precarious bonds, and, eventually, to bail out and nationalize the

1. Jochen Felsenheimer, How To Be a Zillionaire*, CREDIT NEWSL. (Assénagon Credit
Mgmt GmbH, Munich, Ger.), Sept. 22, 2010, at 1, available at http://www.assenagon.com/
uploads/media/Credit_Newsletter_2010_07_en_01.pdf. Dr. Jochen Felsenheimer, of Assénagon
Asset Management S.A., added that, because of “recent developments, all of the above figures
should be multiplied by 100 to reflect reality more accurate[ly].” Id.
2. Insolvency is the inability “to pay one’s debts as they fall due or in the usual course of
business.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 867 (9th ed. 2009). Insolvency is distinct from
bankruptcy, which is the statutory process by which a debtor, who is usually insolvent, seeks
financial relief via a judicially supervised process for satisfying his creditors. See id. at 166–67.
3. Ian Bremmer & Nouriel Roubini, Expect the World Economy To Suffer Through 2009,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 23, 2009, at A15 (describing the chain of consequences flowing from U.S.
monetary policy, eventually resulting in “insolvent households”).
4. Noam Cohen, A Word Insolvent Companies Avoid, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 2008, at B6
(listing a variety of corporate insolvencies declared in 2008).
5. ANDREW ROSS SORKIN, TOO BIG TO FAIL: THE INSIDE STORY OF HOW WALL
STREET AND WASHINGTON FOUGHT TO SAVE THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM FROM CRISIS—AND
THEMSELVES 7 (2009).
6. Laura Slattery, Planet Business, IRISH TIMES, Nov. 30, 2007, at 4.
7. In Brief, WALL ST. J., Dec. 4, 2008, at C2.
8. Michael Lewis describes Anglo Irish as one of three banks in Ireland taking on so much
debt that their losses “would absorb every penny of Irish taxes for at least the next three years.”
Michael Lewis, When Irish Eyes Are Crying, VANITY FAIR, Mar. 2011, at 174, 176.
9. Simon Carswell, More Questions than Answers on Government Recapitalisation
Proposal, IRISH TIMES, Dec. 16, 2008, at 20.
10. Id.
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12

bank. Then, with the threat of systemic risk seemingly contained,
the government announced its plan for “appropriate burden13
sharing.”
Burden sharing essentially meant the Irish government would
lower its cost to operate Anglo Irish by persuading the fallen bank’s
bondholders to accept lower bond payments. Such restructurings
occur through an exchange offer, in which a bond issuer encourages
its bondholders to swap the bonds nearing default for new bonds that
14
the issuer can honor. A complication arises when some bondholders
15
refuse to participate or hold out for a more favorable alternative.
16
Because the distressed bonds continue to be valid contracts until
17
surrendered, holdouts can sue for full payment, upending an issuer’s
18
prime motivation for an exchange. Thus, as a preventative measure
against holdouts, many insolvent institutional debtors do as Anglo
Irish did and pair their exchange offers with exit consents. A use of a
19
bond’s modification clause, an exit consent provides that the
bondholders agreeing to an exchange for new bonds, as a term of
their acceptance, pledge their votes to impair the contract language of
20
the old bonds. The goal is to make the old bonds comparably

11. Arthur Beesley, Where Does the State Go from Here?, IRISH TIMES, Jan. 21, 2009, at 18.
12. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 198–99 (2008) (“A common
factor in the various definitions of systemic risk is that a trigger event, such as an . . .
institutional failure, causes a chain of bad economic consequences . . . .”).
13. Press Release, Minister for Finance, Minister’s Statement on Banking (Sept. 30, 2010),
available at http://www.finance.gov.ie/news-centre/press-releases/minister’s-statement-banking30-september-2010.
14. John C. Coffee, Jr. & William A. Klein, Bondholder Coercion: The Problem of
Constrained Choice in Debt Tender Offers and Recapitalizations, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1207, 1224–
25 (1991).
15. Steven L. Schwarcz, Global Decentralization and the Subnational Debt Problem, 51
DUKE L.J. 1179, 1250 (2002).
16. See WILLIAM W. BRATTON, CORPORATE FINANCE: CASES AND MATERIALS 341 (6th
ed. 2008) (describing “distress” generally as a situation in which a corporate debtor is “in
financial difficulty” and therefore requires a “lessening [of] its debt obligations”).
17. See 1 ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1.4, at 14 (Joseph M.
Perillo ed., rev. ed. 1993) (terming a trust indenture, the contractual language that backs a bond,
a “contract of adhesion”); AARON RACHELSON, CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS, MERGERS, AND
DIVESTITURES § 11:134 (2013), available at CAMD § 11:134 (Westlaw) (“The legal treatment of
debtholders—what is referred to as the ‘bond doctrine’—focuses on the proposition that the
rights of debtholders are limited to the terms of their contract.”).
18. Marcel Kahan, Rethinking Corporate Bonds: The Trade-Off Between Individual and
Collective Rights, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1040, 1055–56 (2002).
19. See infra Part I.B.
20. Coffee & Klein, supra note 14, at 1224–25.
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unattractive and thereby incent would-be holdouts to participate in
21
the exchange, or at least to render their recalcitrance toothless.
Bondholders may challenge exit consents as a breach of the
22
implied contractual duty of good faith and fair dealing. Under the
23
leading case on exit consents, Katz v. Oak Industries Inc., an issuer
24
meets this duty as long as its behavior is not “wrongfully coercive.”
To make this determination, Katz instructs courts to consider whether
the original contracting parties would have permitted the exit
25
consent’s terms had they foreseen them at the time of contracting. In
the quarter century that followed, exit consents were deemed
permissible when they complied with the requirements of Katz. When
one of Anglo Irish’s holdout investors sued in a case arising from the
burden-sharing program, however, an English court refused to follow
Katz. In Assénagon Asset Management v. Irish Bank Resolution
26
Corp., the Chancery Division of the High Court of Justice in
England called exit consents an abuse of “the purposes for which
27
[bondholder] majorities . . . are given power to bind minorities,” and
found a breach of the good faith duty laterally as among the
28
bondholders. The Court of Appeal was scheduled to hear arguments
appealing the lower court’s ruling, but, at the eleventh hour, Irish
Bank Resolution Corp. (IBRC) dropped its appeal, leaving the High
29
Court’s ruling to stand.
One scholar encapsulated the legal community’s collective
reaction to Assénagon when she asked whether England had “killed”
30
the exit consent. Neither hyperbolic nor hypothetical, her question
evoked twin sources of uncertainty. In the short term, this uncertainty
has flowed from the starkly different legal treatment exit consents
have received on the other side of the Atlantic. Bond contracts
21. Id.
22. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981).
23. Katz v. Oak Indus. Inc., 508 A.2d 873 (Del. Ch. 1986).
24. Id. at 880; see infra Part II.B.1.
25. Katz, 508 A.2d at 879–80; see infra Part II.B.1.
26. Assénagon Asset Mgmt. S.A. v. Irish Bank Resolution Corp., [2012] EWHC (Ch) 2090
(Eng.).
27. Id. [85].
28. See id. (describing the abuse of power as occurring when an individual bondholder
votes to the detriment of other bondholders in the same class).
29. Sandrine Bradley, Creditors Circle IBRC over €1.8bn Loss, INT’L FINANCING REV.,
(Mar. 15, 2013), http://www.ifre.com/creditors-circle-ibrc-over-€18-bn-loss/21074204.article.
30. Anna Gelpern, Exit Consents Killed in England?, CREDIT SLIPS (July 27, 2012, 2:22
PM), http://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2012/07/exit-consents-killed-in-england.html.
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predominantly contain English or New York choice-of-law
31
provisions, suggesting that otherwise identical bonds could receive
32
disparate treatment because of their choice-of-law clauses. In the
long term, this uncertainty has flowed from what Assénagon might
mean on this side of the Atlantic. As a Delaware case, Katz has
33
merely persuasive authority under New York law. To the extent that
34
Assénagon was more persuasive and English law remains ascendant
35
in the realm of finance, the question then arises whether this
apparent transatlantic split might actually presage a new unanimity in
which Assénagon becomes the seminal case on exit consents.
Ever in the background of this legal debate are global economic
events. Indeed, there continue to be many insolvent borrowers, an
important subset of which—sovereign borrowers—lack the ability to
declare bankruptcy and therefore have no effective means of
36
restructuring outside of exchange offers. While the Eurozone
37
sovereign-debt crisis persists as a macroeconomic albatross, any
31. Many also contain German choice-of-law provisions, but German bonds require a
unanimous vote of bondholders for modification and thus are not susceptible to exit consents.
See INT’L MONETARY FUND, REVIEWING THE PROCESS FOR SOVEREIGN DEBT
RESTRUCTURING WITHIN THE EXISTING LEGAL FRAMEWORK 25, 29 (2003), available at
https://www.imf.org/external/np/pdr/sdrm/2003/080103.pdf.
32. See Gelpern, supra note 30 (“Tons of past and imminent restructurings (think Spanish
banks) are at stake.”).
33. When courts in New York have cited Katz, they have done so to support the general
proposition that borrower-lender relationships are contractual in nature. See, e.g., United States
v. Jolly, 102 F.3d 46, 48 (2d Cir. 1996) (“[A] firm’s obligations to creditors are generally
regarded solely as contractual.”); Page Mill Asset Mgmt. v. Credit Suisse First Bos. Corp., No.
98 CIV. 6907 MBM, 2000 WL 335557, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2000) (using Katz to support
bond duties being contractual, rather than fiduciary, in nature).
34. 1 CARMODY-WAIT 2d: NEW YORK PRACTICE WITH FORMS § 2:336 (2007), available at
CW2D § 2:336 (Westlaw) (citations omitted) (noting that, because the common law of New
York derives from the common law of England, English court decisions have value in New York
courts).
35. See Dominic Carman, The Long Arm of the Law—City Firms with a Global Reach,
TIMES (London), July 25, 2006, at 4 (“Americans may now export the English language to the
world, but English commercial law . . . remains a world beater.”); Didier Martin & Forrest G.
Alogna, New Delaware, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 20, 2007, 12:01 AM), http://online.wsj.com/news/
articles/SB119810493339240635 (stating that “expensive and restrictive” American regulation
makes English law preferable for corporate transactions).
36. Bankruptcy is not an option for sovereign borrowers, as there is no bankruptcy scheme
for them. See CARMEN M. REINHART & KENNETH S. ROGOFF, THIS TIME IS DIFFERENT:
EIGHT CENTURIES OF FINANCIAL FOLLY 53 (2009) (“[P]erhaps the most fundamental
‘imperfection’ of international capital markets [is] the lack of a supernational legal framework
for enforcing debt contracts across borders.”).
37. Charles Forelle & Marcus Walker, Euro-Zone Risks Return to Fore, WALL ST. J., June
14, 2013, at C1; Eduardo Porter, Economists Agree: Solutions Are Elusive, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24,
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solution demands a clear understanding of the tools for unwinding the
most troubled sovereign bonds. Hence, delineating the current state
of the exit consent would make a critical contribution toward greater
world economic certainty. In that spirit—and given a lack of scholarly
attention to date—this Note systematically examines the history,
purpose, and use of the exit consent. It then proposes an
interpretation of Assénagon that better accords with the doctrinal
assumptions of the bond relationship and the economic realities of
the international bond market.
This Note proceeds in five parts. Part I introduces the exit
consent’s history and mechanics, and Part II presents Katz’s rationale
for permitting the maneuver, as well as other relevant legal
precedents. This background discussion continues in Part III, which
details the context and facts of Assénagon. This Part closes with the
High Court’s rationale for not permitting the exit consent. Part IV
elucidates Assénagon’s importance with three alternative (though not
mutually exclusive) glosses, demonstrating that the High Court’s
analysis, however well-intentioned, unduly dismisses important
market realities in which the exit consent is likely to be used. Part V
proposes a means for fitting Assénagon within Katz and its progeny
and for moving toward a true transatlantic standard for exit consents.
First, it critiques the creation of a lateral good faith duty, finding it
inapt for the relationships underpinning a bond like the one at issue
in Assénagon. To close, this Part offers a refinement of Assénagon
that harmonizes the case with Katz. Although this interpretation
includes discarding the lateral good faith duty, more fundamentally, it
entails focusing legal analysis upon the underlying bond transaction.
This Note cannot envision the innumerable future scenarios in
which an exit consent will be necessary. Rather, it aspires to elucidate
the dynamics and doctrines implicated by the exit consent’s
application. A thorough reexamination of the exit consent’s purposes
and standards will not only help contain some of the most vexing legal
obstacles in finance but also go a long way toward bringing greatly
needed steadiness to world markets.

2013, at B1; Richard Silk, Economists See Further Slowdown in China, WALL ST. J. (July 8, 2013,
2:45 AM) http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887323823004578593200107930868
(attributing sluggish economic growth in China to a paucity of export markets).
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I. THE HISTORY AND USE OF THE EXIT CONSENT
Oftentimes, financial innovation gives rise to legal innovation,
38
which, in turn, begets judicial scrutiny. In a parallel fashion, this Part
introduces exit consents, first, by introducing a financial innovation,
the junk bond. Second, this Part details how the riskiness of junk
bonds gave rise to a legal innovation: the exit consent. This discussion
continues in Part II, which catalogues judicial and legislative
treatment of the exit consent.
A. History and Context
The history of the exit consent begins in the 1980s, a decade
“mid-wived in a period of dynamic innovation in corporate
39
40
transactions,” perhaps the best-known of which is the junk bond.
Strictly speaking, junk bonds were not innovative; their history
41
extends back to the 1910s, when they financed firms in dire straits.
Rather, the use of junk bonds in the 1980s was innovative, as this
dusty investment vehicle went from funding companies that had
42
fallen upon hard times to funding new, unproven ventures. Their
43
emblematic promoter was Michael Milken, a financier who pitched
junk bonds using research that showed they outperformed
44
investment-grade securities, even after controlling for default risk.
38. See Roberta Romano, After the Revolution in Corporate Law, 55 J. LEGAL EDUC. 342,
348 (2005) (“Modern finance and the new economic theories of the firm provided the analytical
tools for understanding the new deals transforming corporate practice in the 1980s and how the
legal system should respond to those challenges.”); see also Matt Levine, “Everybody’s Doing
It” Legal Theory Does Not Protect English Bank Restructurings, DEALBREAKER (July 27, 2012,
5:03 PM), http://dealbreaker.com/2012/07/everybodys-doing-it-legal-theory-does-not-protectenglish-bank-restructurings (“When people talk about financial innovation one of the main
things they mean is legal innovation.”).
39. Romano, supra note 38, at 342.
40. Id. at 347. Junk bonds are bonds that major credit rating agencies categorize as being
below investment grade (that is, with “junk” status). RICHARD A. BREALEY, STEWART C.
MYERS & FRANKLIN ALLEN, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 595–96 (11th ed. 2014).
41. See GLENN YAGO, JUNK BONDS: HOW HIGH YIELD SECURITIES RESTRUCTURED
CORPORATE AMERICA 14–20 (1991) (discussing the historical background and uses of junk
bonds). Such underperforming companies have the evocative name “fallen angels.” Id. at 18.
42. Id. at 21.
43. Id.; see Romano, supra note 38, at 347 (“Milken reinvented junk bonds.”). Books about
Milken and his investment bank, Drexel Burnham Lambert, make for interesting reading in
their own right. See generally, e.g., CONNIE BRUCK, PREDATORS’ BALL: THE INSIDE STORY OF
DREXEL BURNHAM AND THE RISE OF THE JUNK BOND RAIDERS (1989); JAMES B. STEWART,
DEN OF THIEVES (1991).
44. YAGO, supra note 41, at 23. This higher return accounts for the junk bond’s more polite
appellation: “high-yield bonds.”
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As it turned out, the businesses issuing junk bonds were
fundamentally riskier than those issuing investment-grade bonds, and
therefore default rates for junk bonds were much higher than
45
advertised.
As payment came due on the riskiest junk bonds, their distressed
issuers faced difficult choices. A bond evinces a contractual promise
46
47
to pay. To avoid breach of contract and the messy consequences of
default, an insolvent bond issuer generally has three options:
48
bankruptcy, bond repurchases, or exchange offers.
49
First, the bond issuer might choose bankruptcy. Bankruptcy’s
main benefit is preventing a “race to the courthouse,” a competition
among creditors in which each races to sue the debtor to receive
50
priority based upon time of suit. The insolvent bond issuer benefits
51
from bankruptcy’s automatic stay, which gives the issuer the time to
52
dispose of its obligations and a method for doing so. Similarly,
creditors have a judicially supervised process that ensures their claims
are settled upon statutorily sanctioned priority rather than in the
53
order of their lawsuits. On balance, however, when insolvency arises
from a bond obligation, bond issuer and bondholder alike have
compelling incentives to avoid bankruptcy. For the bond issuer,
bankruptcy’s dramatic consequences may make this option an
overreaction to defaulting bonds. For the bondholders, though they

45. PATRICK A. GAUGHAN, MERGERS, ACQUISITIONS, AND CORPORATE
RESTRUCTURINGS 344–45 (5th ed. 2010). Financial literature describes these studies’
methodological faults in great detail. To be brief, Milken used research that measured default
rates within one or two years after the bonds’ issue dates. Later studies—called “mortality rate
analyses”—tested default rates ten years after the issue dates and found default rates that
debunked the earlier studies. Id.
46. 1 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 2:20, at 175 (4th ed. 1990). A bond
issuer makes two kinds of payments to its bondholders: (1) interest, which is paid in regular
intervals until the maturity date, and (2) principal or face value, which is paid at maturity.
BREALEY ET AL., supra note 40, at 46.
47. See, e.g., 1 ARTHUR S. DEWING, THE FINANCIAL POLICY OF CORPORATIONS 172–74
(6th ed. 1953) (explaining the provisions of bonds and the obligations of the bond issuer and
bondholder).
48. BRATTON, supra note 16, at 411.
49. BREALEY, ET AL., supra note 40, at 850.
50. BRATTON, supra note 16, at 411.
51. An automatic stay halts almost all actions by creditors so that claims may be satisfied
according to legal priority, first priority usually belonging to secured creditors. 11 U.S.C.
§ 362(a) (2012).
52. BRATTON, supra note 16, at 36.
53. Id.
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54

are creditors, they conceive of themselves as investors who desire
55
predictable streams of passive income. Hence, the bankruptcy
56
liquidation and priority process does not comport with bondholders’
57
conceptions of their role.
Further, and especially relevant to a discussion of exit consents,
bankruptcy does not exist for a significant class of bond issuers:
58
sovereigns. To be sure, sovereigns have other incentives for
satisfying their creditors, but only up to a point. By way of example,
state governments in the United States have political incentives for
satisfying their debts, but they are likely to prioritize those debts
59
according to constituency groups. Given a choice between paying an
in-state pensioner or an out-of-state bondholder, state leadership
60
almost always will choose the former. Realpolitik, therefore,
suggests that sovereigns and their creditors must look elsewhere for
debt relief.
As a second option, a distressed bond issuer—sovereign or
corporate—might consider a bond repurchase, provided via standard
61
clauses in most bonds. Assuming the debt is publicly traded and the
bond issuer has access to cash, the issuer could buy back enough of its
62
bonds to reduce the overall cost of its debt. Yet therein lies a
paradox for the insolvent borrower. If the issuer had the cash to
repurchase its bonds, it probably would not need to repurchase its
63
bonds; it simply could continue bond payments.
Because bankruptcy may be impossible or too painful, and
because a bond repurchase may be impractical, a bond issuer in need

54. Morey W. McDaniel, Bondholders and Corporate Governance, 41 BUS. LAW. 413, 413
(1986).
55. Cf. BREALEY, ET AL., supra note 40, at 46 (explaining that bondholders regularly
receive interest payments from bonds until the bonds’ maturity).
56. See id. (describing the bankruptcy liquidation and priority process).
57. See id. at 853 (describing the expectations of a bondholder).
58. Lee C. Buchheit & G. Mitu Gulati, Exit Consents in Sovereign Bond Exchanges, 48
UCLA L. REV. 59, 67 (2000) (“Unlike [a] [r]epublic . . . , a corporate bond issuer always has the
option of bankruptcy . . . .”).
59. See Emily D. Johnson & Ernest A. Young, The Constitutional Law of State Debt, 7
DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 117, 149 (2012) (discussing a state’s need to “break or alter
promises” to reduce obligations and the negative implications of breaking promises to particular
constituencies).
60. Id.
61. BRATTON, supra note 16, at 342.
62. Id. The financial term for this is the “carrying cost” of liabilities. Id. at 341–42.
63. Id.
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of restructuring is likely to choose the third option: an exchange
64
offer. In a bond exchange, the bond issuer unwinds its distressed
bonds individually by negotiating with its bondholders to accept new
65
bonds with terms friendlier to the issuer. In turn, the bondholders
66
surrender their right to enforce the contract terms of the old bond.
The terms of the old bond still govern as between the issuer and
bondholders who do not participate in an exchange, however, and this
presents a significant problem for the distressed issuer. An issuer’s
prime motivation for an exchange is to lower the total cost of its bond
obligations, achieved by lowering its payments across bondholders. If
some bondholders do not acquiesce to an exchange and demand some
payment above the exchange price, the likelihood increases that other
67
bondholders will refuse the exchange offer. The result is the
68
“holdout problem,” a variant of the classic prisoner’s dilemma in
which a rational actor gains more through recalcitrance than
69
acceptance. The distressed bond issuer seeking a successful
exchange needs not only to create an attractive new bond but also to
employ some means of making the old bonds unattractive. In
practice, it does this by pairing its exchange offer with an exit consent.
B. The Exit Consent
In the same way that junk bonds were not innovative in
themselves, neither was the exit consent (again, strictly speaking)
innovative in itself. Rather, the exit consent was an innovative use of
provisions already within the bond contract. The operative provision

64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Coffee & Klein, supra note 14, at 1228–29.
68. The prisoner’s dilemma is a renowned concept in game theory, explaining how
individuals act given asymmetries in information. For a general introduction to the prisoner’s
dilemma, with explication that is particularly relevant to legal practice, see HOWELL E.
JACKSON, LOUIS KAPLOW, STEVEN M. SHAVELL, W. KIP VISCUSI & DAVID COPE,
ANALYTICAL METHODS FOR LAWYERS 41–42 (2d ed. 2010).
69. Coffee & Klein, supra note 14, at 1228–29. Although the precise economic calculations
are well beyond this Note’s scope, Professors Coffee and Klein go to lengths to persuasively
illustrate that, in an exchange offer without an exit consent, all bondholders earn the most
money by not participating in an exchange. Id.; see also Lewis S. Peterson, Note, Who’s Being
Greedy? A Theoretical and Empirical Examination of Holdouts and Coercion in Debt Tender
and Exchange Offers, 103 YALE L.J. 505, 515–24 (1993) (using empirical analysis to demonstrate
that “good coercion” remediates the likelihood of holdouts).
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70

is the modification clause. Under this provision, the bondholders
may modify the contract terms binding the bond issuer, provided that
the bondholders pass a resolution that meets some vote threshold,
71
usually a supermajority. Some clauses require the vote to occur at a
72
physical meeting of bondholders with some specified quorum. Other
clauses permit modifications authorized in writing by a majority of
73
bondholders. In either drafting, the modification clause likely also
includes language specifying that approved bondholder resolutions
74
bind all bondholders. In crafting an exchange offer, all the issuer
need do is to make a new bond that will attract at least as many
bondholders as would meet the modification clause’s specified vote
75
threshold.
Then, that same group of bondholders would
simultaneously cast a vote modifying the old bonds so as to make
them unattractive, in hopes of cajoling the participation of would-be
70. For a discussion of the evolution and other uses of modification clauses, also known as
collective-action clauses, see generally W. Mark C. Weidemaier & Mitu Gulati, A People’s
History of Collective Action Clauses, 54 VA. J. INT’L L. 51 (2013).
71. The relevant language in Anglo Irish’s prospectus provided as follows:
The Trust Deed contains provisions for convening meetings of the Noteholders to
consider any matter affecting their interests, including the sanctioning by
Extraordinary Resolution of a modification of the Notes . . . . The quorum at any such
meeting for passing an Extraordinary Resolution is . . . a clear majority . . . , except
that at any meeting the business of which includes the modification of certain
provisions . . . (including modifying the date of maturity of the Notes or any date for
payment of interest thereon, reducing or cancelling the amount of principal or the
rate of interest payable in respect of the Notes or altering the currency of payment of
the Notes . . .), . . . the quorum shall be one or more persons holding or representing
not less than two-thirds in nominal amount of the Notes for the time being
outstanding.
Anglo Irish Bank Corp., PLC, Offering Circular, €30,000,000,000 Euro Medium Term Note
Programme, ¶ 14(i), at 46 (May 24, 2007), available at http://www.ise.ie/debt_documents/
Anglo%20Irish%20Bank%20Corporation%20plc_8724.pdf.
72. Id.
73. Republic of Ecuador, Offering Memorandum, U.S.$650,000,000; 9.375% Bonds Due
2015, at 95 (Dec. 7, 2005), available at http://www.erlassjahr.de/cms/upload/
21.OfferingMemorandum.pdf (“Any Modification of the indenture or the terms and conditions
of the bonds may be made or given pursuant to a written action of the holders of the bonds
without the need for a meeting or by vote of the holders of the bonds taken at a meeting of
holders . . . .”).
74. See, e.g., Anglo Irish Bank Corp., PLC, supra note 71, at 46 (“An Extraordinary
Resolution passed at any meeting of the Noteholders shall be binding on all the Noteholders,
whether or not they are present at the meeting . . . .”).
75. See, e.g., Landon Thomas, Jr., Hedge Funds Take Another Look at Greek Debt, N.Y.
TIMES DEALBOOK (Feb. 22, 2012, 1:47 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/02/22/hedgefunds-take-another-look-at-greek-debt (“Greece—in setting a participation threshold of 66
percent—is more or less indicating that it believes that percentage of investors will
participate.”).
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holdouts. Alternatively, barring full participation, the vote would
alter a covenant, the absence of which would render the holdout
76
investor foolhardy and harmless.
II. A LEGAL PRIMER ON EXIT CONSENTS
Like garden-variety contract modifications, changes to bonds are
permissible as long as they are consistent with the bonds’ contractual
language and with mandatory rules supplied by legislatures and
77
courts. On the one hand, statutory law addresses what changes an
issuer may seek (and, perhaps more importantly, what changes an
issuer cannot seek); on the other, case law addresses how an issuer
may go about seeking those changes. This Part discusses each.
This Part focuses on U.S. precedents for two reasons. First,
78
English courts accept U.S. statutory law as persuasive authority, and
79
English case law was silent on exit consents until Assénagon. Second,
English law long permitted majority action clauses—the contractual
means by which exit consents occur—so most modern legislative and
judicial activity guiding the transition from unanimity to majority
action clauses has necessarily come from U.S. legislatures and
80
courts.

76. For example, a creative issuer might increase the voting percentage necessary to
accelerate the debt, making it nearly impossible for the remaining bondholders to declare an
event of default—a course of action that would lower the bond’s value without touching a
payment term. Andrew Laurance Bab, Debt Tender Offer Techniques and the Problem of
Coercion, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 846, 852–53 (1991). In the years since Professor Bab’s work, many
provisions that an issuer might target have moved to the bond’s list of reserved matters,
meaning that an issuer typically would require a supermajority vote to be adopted. COMM. ON
INT’L ECON. POL’Y AND REFORM, REVISITING SOVEREIGN BANKRUPTCY 3 (2013), available at
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2013/10/sovereign%20bankruptcy/ciep
r_2013_revisitingsovereignbankruptcyreport.pdf.
77. 17A AM. JUR. 2D Contracts § 507 (2014) (“[P]arties to an existing contract may, by
mutual assent, modify it, provided the modification does not violate the law or public policy,
and provided that there is consideration for the new agreement or that it satisfies a statute or is
made under circumstances making consideration unnecessary.” (footnote omitted)).
78. See Assénagon Asset Mgmt. S.A. v. Irish Bank Resolution Corp., [2012] EWHC (Ch)
2090, [49] (Eng.) (taking note of the Trust Indenture Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aaa–bbbb(2012),
specifically its “prohibition against the modification of payment terms without the unanimous
consent of all the holders of securities issued and registered with the SEC under the US [sic]
Securities Act of 1933”).
79. Id. at [1] (calling the legality of exit consents a question of first impression under
English law).
80. Lee C. Buchheit & G. Mitu Gulati, Sovereign Bonds and the Collective Will, 51 EMORY
L.J. 1317, 1324 (2002).
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A. The Trust Indenture Act of 1939
Before 1939, some bonds allowed a simple majority of
81
bondholders to modify any provision within the bond. Still in the
shadow of the Wall Street crash of 1929, the then–newly created
Securities and Exchange Commission studied majority action clauses
82
and found them detrimental to the interests of all bondholders. Also
present were reports of bondholder majorities acting upon biased or
83
plainly false information.
In response, Congress passed the Trust Indenture Act of 1939
84
(TIA) amid the legislative housekeeping that followed the Securities
85
Act of 1933. As originally adopted, the TIA effectively forbade
inclusion of simple-majority action clauses, the provisions that had
86
allowed for prior malfeasance by bond issuers. Today, the TIA
contains two prohibitions relevant to the use of exit consents. Section
316(a) requires that, if the issuer triggers a default event, at least a
87
simple majority of bondholders is required to waive the default.
Section 316(b) prohibits a bond issuer from denying payment to a
88
bondholder without that bondholder’s consent. Together, these
sections effectively prohibit an exit consent that would modify a
89
90
bond’s acceleration or payment terms.
Congress has said little beyond the TIA on the substance of exit
consents, and has said essentially nothing on how distressed issuers

81. BRATTON, supra note 16, at 347.
82. See SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT ON THE STUDY AND INVESTIGATION OF THE
WORK, ACTIVITIES, PERSONNEL AND FUNCTIONS OF PROTECTIVE AND REORGANIZATION
COMMITTEES pt. VIII, at 177–83 (1938).
83. BRATTON, supra note 16, at 347.
84. Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aaa–17bbbb (2012).
85. Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77z
(2012)).
86. Buchheit & Gulati, supra note 58, at 66–67. Though the TIA is mainly applicable to
corporate bonds, sovereign bonds de facto incorporate its strictures because their drafters often
used TIA-compliant corporate-bond agreements as templates for sovereign bonds. Id. at 67.
87. Trust Indenture Act of 1939 § 316(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77ppp(a).
88. Id. § 316(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77ppp(b). But see Timothy B. DeSieno & Robert T. Carey,
Changing Terms of Bond Indentures; Are Issuers Overreaching in Consent Solicitations?, N.Y.
L.J., Nov. 21, 2005, at 17 (arguing that the “precise meaning” of § 316(b) is ambiguous).
89. Acceleration terms are within the default clause, which lists the conditions of a
default—including a missed principal or interest payment—and a relevant grace period, if any,
for rectifying the event of default. See, e.g., Anglo Irish Bank Corp., PLC, supra note 71, ¶¶ 8–9,
at 41–44.
90. Payment terms include principal amounts, interest rates, currencies of payment, and
the like. See, e.g., id. ¶ 14(i), at 46.

DRAKE IN PP (FLIP) (DO NOT DELETE)

1602

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

3/18/2014 1:11 PM

[Vol. 63:1589

may employ them. That task of definition and interpretation has been
left to the courts.
B. Case Law
91

English courts traditionally have been silent on exit consents. In
their absence, Delaware and New York, two states well-respected for
financial jurisprudence, have provided the leading analysis of the exit
consent’s propriety.
1. Delaware. Katz v. Oak Industries Inc., the seminal case on exit
92
consents, arose from transactions emblematic of the junk bond era.
Oak Industries Inc. (Oak) had pursued a growth-through-expansion
93
strategy that became troublingly unprofitable by the mid-1980s. A
potential lifeline came from Allied-Signal, Inc., a firm that
conditioned an offer to buy $15 million worth of Oak’s stock upon
94
Oak reducing its long-term debt load by 85 percent. Oak’s plan was
to settle with existing bondholders using “Payment Certificates,”
95
redeemable for cash above the bonds’ then–market rate. The
problem was that the bonds included covenants precluding precisely
96
this arrangement. Oak’s solution was to have participating
bondholders vote to remove the obstructing covenants and then
97
accept the payment certificates upon abandoning the old bonds.
98
Though likely to have a positive effect for Oak’s shareholders, this
exchange presented bondholders with the apparent Hobson’s choice
of settling for less than the bonds’ face value or being left with bonds
that would be less valuable because of the lack of financial
99
protections. Thereupon, a class of investors sued to enjoin the
exchange, claiming that it favored shareholders at the expense of

91. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
92. In fact, Oak’s restructuring process is a part of the curriculum of leading graduate
business programs. See generally WILLIAM A. SAHLMAN & BURTON C. HURLOCK, OAK
INDUSTRIES, INC. (Harvard Bus. Sch. Case No. 292-086, rev. 1993).
93. MICHAEL C. KNAPP, CONTEMPORARY AUDITING: REAL CASES AND ISSUES 237–38
(7th ed. 2008).
94. Katz v. Oak Indus. Inc., 508 A.2d 873, 876–77 (Del. Ch. 1986).
95. Id. at 876.
96. Id. at 877.
97. Id.
98. The company’s stock had fallen from $30 to $2 per share. Id. at 875 n.2.
99. See id. at 878 (“[A] rational bondholder [was] ‘forced’ to tender and consent.”).
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bondholders, that its structure was coercive, and that this coercion
100
violated the implied contractual duty of good faith and fair dealing.
The Delaware Court of Chancery disagreed, allowing the
exchange to proceed. Before ruling on the facts, the court resolved
two threshold matters that would set the framework for analyzing
future exit consents. First, the court found that the relationship
between a bond issuer and its bondholders had a contractual, not a
101
fiduciary, basis. Second, it failed to find the use of a “coercive” offer
102
to be determinative on its own. Instead, the court held that the
coercion must be characterized in some negative way, as “wrongfully
103
coercive,” for example. In other words, legal analysis should begin
104
with the adverb modifying “coercive.” To supply that normative
judgment, the court reasoned that wrongful behavior might be
105
inferred when the coercion violated a contractual duty. Wrongful
behavior is apparent when one party breaches the express terms of a
contract; but when, as in Katz, the breached duty was implied rather
than expressed, the court supplied the following test:
[I]s it clear from what was expressly agreed upon that the parties
who negotiated the express terms of the contract would have agreed
to proscribe the act later complained of as a breach of the implied
covenant of good faith—had they thought to negotiate with respect
106
to that matter.

Under that test, the facts of Katz suggested no breach. To the
contrary, Oak offered shares redeemable above the then–market
107
price, suggesting a deal the original parties would have approved.
Within a year, the Delaware Court of Chancery applied Katz’s
test to another case with remarkably similar facts. In Kass v. Eastern
108
Air Lines, the defendant corporation had pursued a merger, also

100. Id.
101. Id. at 879.
102. Id. at 879–80.
103. Id. at 880. The court used the homespun example of parents coercing their child to
complete her homework by withholding her allowance until it was finished. Although such a
situation was clearly coercive, no moral opprobrium could be attached to it. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Kass v. E. Air Lines, Inc., Nos. 8700, 8701, 8711, 1986 WL 13008 (Del. Ch. Nov. 14,
1986).
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precluded by covenants within its outstanding bonds. Again, the
issuer had approached its bondholders with an exchange offer
including an exit consent, but this time the issuer had added a
sweetener: for each bond tendered, the bondholder could receive
110
either cash or a travel voucher. The court found that the sweetener
still fell within the Katz rule because it was offered to all
111
In appraising the overall incentives given to
bondholders.
bondholders, Kass instructs courts evaluating exit consents to
112
examine bondholders’ economic motivations. If, for example, a
proposed offer creates economic motivations that differ for individual
bondholders, it may raise a fairness concern. In this way, Kass
suggests a good faith inquiry into the motivations of the bond issuer.
Although not legally determinative, then, each party’s economic
motivations are instructive in answering the threshold question of
113
whether to characterize an exchange as “wrongfully coercive.”
114
Katz’s progeny totals more than seventy cases, some related to
115
116
exit consents, others simply construing the good faith duty. That
latter issue of the good faith duty—and the related, broader issue of
how far it extends—occupied the attention of other courts, as
financial innovation spawned familiar legal questions.
2. New York. New York state courts have also set out important
standards relevant to bonds and exit consents. Their rationales are
important because New York law governs many bonds, either

109. Id. at 1077.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 1082.
112. See id. (“Each will continue to own bonds and thus each has an economic incentive of
the same kind to evaluate the question whether any threat to the value of his or her bonds posed
by the amendment is more or less valuable than the consideration offered for his or her
consent.”).
113. Cf. Katz v. Oak Indus. Inc., 508 A.2d 873, 880 (Del. Ch. 1986) (defining the wrongfully
coercive test).
114. As of this writing, a Westlaw “KeyCite” search yields seventy-six Delaware cases
referring to Katz.
115. E.g., Lonergan v. EPE Holdings, LLC, 5 A.3d 1008 (Del. Ch. 2010); Jedwab v. MGM
Grand Hotels, Inc., 509 A.2d 584 (Del. Ch. 1986).
116. E.g., Airborne Health, Inc. v. Squid Soap, LP, 984 A.2d 126, 145–47 (Del. Ch. 2009); In
re Kirkwood Kin Corp. v. Dunkin’ Donuts, Inc., No. 94C-03-189-WTQ, 1997 WL 529587, at
*14–17 (Del. Super. Ct. Jan. 29, 1997).
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117

through explicit choice-of-law provisions or as strong persuasive
118
authority.
In New York courts, legal analysis of modern bonds typically
119
begins with Sharon Steel Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A.
120
its legal
Though Sharon’s facts were somewhat complicated,
question was direct: How is a court to interpret boilerplate language
in one bond when its interpretation will affect other contracts in other
market transactions with no real connection to the case aside from
121
sharing the common boilerplate language? The Second Circuit
ruled that boilerplate interpretation is a matter of law, not fact, and
that uniformity of interpretation is necessary for encouraging efficient
122
capital markets.
The court in Sharon was clear that a bond’s explicit language
governs the contract relationship, even if that language is
123
boilerplate; that said, Sharon was generally silent on what implied
124
covenants or parol evidence might inform the bond’s interpretation.
Answering this question touched upon the most sensitive legal issue
125
at the heart of “the highest stakes takeover battle ever”: Kohlberg
126
Kravis Roberts’s (KKR) leveraged buyout of RJR Nabisco, Inc. In

117. See, e.g., United Mexican States, Pricing Supplement, U.S. $30,000,000,000 Global
Medium-Term Notes, Series A, at 12 (Dec. 12, 2002), available at http://data.cbonds.info/
emissions/1378/Prospectus_UMS_2031_tap2.pdf. This prospectus is renowned in the sovereigndebt field because it is the first New York bond issue with a collective-action clause and thus is
credited with reviving the practice under New York law in the modern era. Robert B. Ahdieh,
Between Mandate and Market: Contract Transition in the Shadow of the International Order, 53
EMORY L.J. 691, 698–702, 708–09 (2004).
118. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 762 (1975) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (characterizing the Second Circuit as the “Mother Court” of securities law).
119. Sharon Steel Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 691 F.2d 1039 (2d Cir. 1982).
120. In brief, UV Industries, Inc. (UV), a company that was also party to the lawsuit, had
issued bonds with a covenant requiring the company to distribute assets to shareholders upon
liquidation. UV sold its assets in piecemeal fashion, seemingly skirting the bond’s technical
definition of liquidation. Sharon Steel Corp. sought to buy the last piece of UV but was
thwarted when certain trustees (including Chase Manhattan Bank) refused to sign over control.
Id. at 1042–46.
121. Id. at 1048 (citing Broad v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 642 F.2d 929, 942–43 (5th Cir. 1981)).
122. Id. at 1051.
123. Id.
124. The court did write that corporate custom “might . . . create a fact question . . . .” Id. at
1048.
125. John Helyar & Bryan Burrough, Buy-Out Bluff: How Underdog KKR Won RJR
Nabisco Without Highest Bid, WALL ST. J., Dec. 2, 1988, at A1.
126. The intrigue and outsized personalities of the takeover made for a best-selling book,
BRYAN BURROUGH & JOHN HELYAR, BARBARIANS AT THE GATE: THE FALL OF RJR
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a leveraged buyout, the buyer satisfies the purchase price of a target
127
company using junk bonds. Use of junk bonds harms the target
company’s existing bondholders, however, because their bonds lose
128
value when mixed with the newly acquired low-grade debt.
At the time, an open legal question was whether a target
company (as a bond issuer) violated some implied duty owed to its
existing bondholders when it undertook actions that necessarily
129
degraded their bonds. While the question of what duties were owed
130
was hotly contested in the court of public opinion, the sheer size of
the RJR Nabisco leveraged buyout spurred bondholders to bring the
131
question before a court of law. In Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v.
132
RJR Nabisco, Inc., two institutional bondholders sued RJR Nabisco
and its corporate leadership for breach of the duty of good faith and
133
fair dealing. Finding that the contract did not expressly prohibit a
134
leveraged buyout, the court assessed the existence of an implied
135
duty in relation to those express terms. In other words, an implied
duty is not some unlisted covenant but rather an understanding that
informs whether each party receives the “fruits of the agreement”
136
provided for in the bond’s express terms. Here, the express terms
137
not only made clear that a leveraged buyout was permissible, but
also that the plaintiff investors had seen and participated in similar

NABISCO (1989), and a made-for-television movie, BARBARIANS AT THE GATE (Home Box
Office 1993).
127. BREALEY, ET AL., supra note 40, at 836.
128. Id. at 838–39.
129. See generally William W. Bratton, Jr., Corporate Debt Relationships: Legal Theory in a
Time of Restructuring, 38 DUKE L.J. 92 (1989) (offering various theories of the legal
relationships between bond issuers and bondholders).
130. See, e.g., Allan Sloan, The Rape of the Bondholder, FORBES, Jan. 23, 1989, at 67
(arguing that the nature of the bond relationship had changed so as to make bonds more like
stocks); Benjamin J. Stein, A New Low? The RJR LBO Makes a Travesty of Fiduciary
Responsibility, BARRON’S, Nov. 14, 1988, at 16, 17 (“There are questions of a truly mammoth
breach of duty to bondholders . . . and not just to bondholders of RJR Nabisco.”).
131. See Bratton, supra note 129, at 95 (“Many examples of restructuring-related injury
preceded RJR Nabisco, but it took the RJR Nabisco shock to goad players in the bond markets
into open combat.”).
132. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1504 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
133. Id. at 1507 n.6. Other counts included allegations of fraud, violations of securities laws,
tortious interference with property and contract, and violation of conveyance laws. Id.
134. Id. at 1516.
135. Id. at 1517.
136. Id.
137. Id.
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138

transactions. The court would not “permit an implied covenant to
shoehorn into an indenture additional terms [the parties] . . . wish had
139
been included.”
Although New York law is clear on the scope of duties as
between bond issuers and bondholders, modern case law is relatively
silent on the scope of duties as among the bondholders. The most
relevant case is Hackettstown National Bank v. D.G. Yeungling
140
Brewing Co., in which a member of D.G. Yuengling Brewing
141
Company’s (Yuengling) management —who held both shares and
bonds of the company—voted to delay bond payments, which had the
142
effect of strengthening his position as a shareholder.
The
143
bondholders won, and Hackettstown became the strongest New
York authority that stands for the proposition that a majority of
144
bondholders owe some duty to the minority of bondholders. The
complicating factor is that the Yeungling bondholders acted
145
collusively, which suggests that Hackettstown is about insider
146
control and raises the question of whether the TIA obviated the
147
underlying controversy. As for the application of the good faith
duty, Hackettstown suggests simply that the vote to modify a bond’s
terms be conducted in good faith, rather than that there simply exists
148
some independent good faith duty. This is relevant to current cases
because the latter applies to the relationship between the bond issuer
and the bondholder, whereas the former seems to be the only judicial
basis for inferring a relationship among the bondholders.

138. Id. at 1521.
139. Id. at 1519.
140. Hackettstown Nat’l Bank v. D.G. Yuengling Brewing Co., 74 F. 110 (2d Cir. 1896).
141. This case also has the interesting wrinkle that Yeungling Brewing Company was a
family-run business, so the offending party was a member of the Yeungling family. Id. at 111.
142. Id. at 112.
143. Id. at 110.
144. Buchheit & Gulati, supra note 58, at 76.
145. Id.
146. Mark J. Roe, The Voting Prohibition in Bond Workouts, 97 YALE L.J. 232, 252 & n.53
(1987).
147. See 15 U.S.C. § 77ppp(a) (2008) (requiring unanimity to amend a bond’s payment
terms).
148. See Roe, supra note 146, at 252 n.53 (“[In Hackettstown,] insiders attempted to destroy
a bond issue but were defeated by a judicial holding that a majority vote to change a bond's
terms had to be given in good faith.”).
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III. ASSÉNAGON: THE FALL OF EXIT CONSENTS?
Assénagon is a remarkable case, and only partly because it marks
149
the first time English law ruled on an exit consent and one of the
few times that the use of an exit consent received judicial
150
disapproval. The case is also an artifact of modern finance, a
window into the collapse of an entire national economy and the
curious way in which private debt can morph into sovereign debt.
This Part begins by presenting the macroeconomic factors at play,
including Ireland’s steps toward economic integration with Europe.
This context has greater importance because every baby step toward
integration presaged the case’s thorniest legal and practical
implications. This Part then presents the facts of Assénagon, the legal
claims arising from the Irish government’s use of the exit consent, and
the court’s rationale for denying use of the exit consent.
A. Background: Ireland, Anglo Irish Bank, and Assénagon Asset
Management
Upon independence from Britain in 1949, Ireland’s political
leaders pursued economic growth through connectedness. Ireland
began a “long love affair” with foreign direct investment in the 1960s,
and “embraced free trade” by joining the European Economic
151
Community (the forerunner of the European Union) in 1973.
Economic progress was short-lived: the country’s “knuckle-headed
policy response” to the oil shocks of the 1970s led the Economist to
152
call Ireland the “poorest of the rich” countries as late as 1988.
Yet fifteen years after being “deemed an economic failure,”
153
Ireland had reinvented itself as the “Celtic Tiger.” Ireland’s
unemployment and inflation rates were low; its growth records were
154
unparalleled in Europe; and government debt was low. Reviewing
its earlier, harsh assessment, The Economist attributed Ireland’s
turnaround to monetary consolidation, the creation of a single

149. Assénagon Asset Mgmt. v. Irish Bank Resolution Corp., [2012] EWHC (Ch) 2090, [1]
(Eng.).
150. Gelpern, supra note 30.
151. John Peet, The Luck of the Irish, ECONOMIST, Oct. 14, 2004, at 1, 2; see also LAURA
ALFARO, VINATI DEV & STEPHEN MCINTYRE, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND
IRELAND’S TIGER ECONOMY (A) (Harvard Bus. Sch. Case No. 9-706-007, rev. 2010).
152. Peet, supra note 151, at 1–2.
153. Id.
154. Id.
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European market, a boom in foreign direct investment, and an
155
expansion of the labor force. Of the country’s growing sectors, few
were more impressive than real estate. Construction comprised onequarter of Ireland’s gross domestic product (GDP), and one-fifth of
156
the workforce built houses. Fueling the real estate boom was a
burgeoning banking sector. At the dawn of 2000, lending to real
157
estate–related concerns comprised 8 percent of composite lending.
158
By 2007, it had mushroomed to 28 percent.
In an era characterized by explosive growth, Ireland stood out,
and among the actors responsible for that growth, Anglo Irish Bank
stood far out. Incorporated in 1964 as City of Dublin Bank, the bank
acquired Anglo Irish Bank in 1978 and then reconstituted itself under
159
the name of its subsidiary in 1986. The growth of the new Anglo
Irish Bank largely tracked that of the Celtic Tiger. The bank listed
three lines of business: treasury services (traditionally commercial
paper, currency exchange, and the like); wealth management; and
business lending to target customers including “medium size
corporat[ions]” and “high net worth individuals in Ireland, the UK
160
and in the greater Boston region in the USA.” As of September
2001, Anglo Irish reported its total assets at around €11 billion and
161
capital resources of €950 million. Barely six years later, in March
2007, its self-reported total assets were €88 billion, and capital
162
resources were €7.7 billion. The eightfold increase in assets and
capital within fewer than six years was astounding and, by most
163
financial measures, unsustainable.
155. Tiger, Tiger Burning Bright, ECONOMIST, Oct. 16, 2004, at 2, 4. Ireland introduced the
euro in 1999. Id. at 2.
156. Lewis, supra note 8, at 179.
157. Morgan Kelly, Banking on Very Shaky Foundations, IRISH TIMES, Sept. 7, 2007, at 4.
158. Id.
159. Anglo Irish Bank Corp. PLC, Offering Circular, €1,500,000,000 Euro Medium Term
Note Programme, at 41 (Aug. 15, 2001) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
160. Anglo Irish Bank Corp., PLC, supra note 71, at 51.
161. Anglo Irish Bank Corp., PLC, supra note 159, at 42.
162. Anglo Irish Bank Corp., PLC, supra note 71, at 51.
163. Alan S. Blinder, the economist and former Vice Chairman of the U.S. Federal Reserve,
presents a very readable discussion of debt-to-equity ratios, known as leverage ratios, with a
particular eye to banking and the recession of the late 2000s. See ALAN S. BLINDER, AFTER THE
MUSIC STOPPED: THE FINANCE CRISIS, THE RESPONSE, AND THE WORK AHEAD 50–53 (2013).
Truth be told, financial ratios seldom “present very much insight” on their own, but rather are
useful in conjunction with other criteria, such as industry standards, historical values, peer
companies, and credit ratings. MOORAD CHOUDHRY, THE PRINCIPLES OF BANKING 155–56
(2012).
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To fund its growth, Anglo Irish issued bonds. Among the
purchasers was a Munich-based hedge fund, Assénagon Asset
Management (Assénagon). Founded in 2007, Assénagon managed
€10 billion, which it claimed to deploy through the use of “experience,
164
independence, profound risk sensitivity and innovative strength.” In
September 2009, a German-language fund newsletter compared the
credit markets to purchasing lemons, and warned that only ambitious
165
optimism justified some of the prices. The newsletter’s publication
date was within the timeframe that Assénagon made some of its most
significant purchases of Anglo Irish bonds, by this time priced at 40
166
percent of their face value.
Assénagon was not alone in identifying a possible real estate
167
bubble. Scholars had warned of overextension as early as 2007. The
same Economist article that assessed Ireland’s “economic miracle”
summarized the turnaround as “[u]nrepeatable” and the result of
168
“one-off” fortuities.
The article closed by noting Ireland’s
169
“dangerous obsession with property.”
B. The Case
In hindsight, it is clear that Ireland exhibited the textbook signs
170
of a real estate bubble. The year 2008 was unkind to actors across
171
the financial sector, but it was particularly so to Anglo Irish. In
September 2008, the bank had €101 billion in gross assets on its
172
balance sheet, a figure that represented half of Ireland’s GDP. The
164. News Release, Morningstar, Inc., Assenagon Selects Morningstar to Supply European
and U.S. Equity Data (Feb. 15, 2011), available at http://corporate.morningstar.com/us/
documents/Quotes/AssenagonSelectsMorningstarEquityData.pdf.
165. Jochen Felsenheimer, Die Goldenen Zitronen, CREDIT NEWSL. (Assénagon Credit
Mgmt GmbH, Munich, Ger.), Sept. 3, 2009, at 1, available at http://www.assenagon.com/uploads/
media/Credit_Newsletter_2009_30.pdf.
166. Assénagon Asset Mgmt. S.A. v. Irish Bank Resolution Corp., [2012] EWHC (Ch) 2090,
[26] (Eng.). For a discussion of Anglo Irish’s collapse in relation to the broader European
economic crisis of 2008, see generally Lewis, supra note 8.
167. Kelly, supra note 157.
168. Tiger, Tiger Burning Bright, supra note 155, at 4.
169. Id.
170. CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER & ROBERT Z. ALIBER, MANIAS, PANICS, AND CRASHES:
A HISTORY OF FINANCIAL CRISES 274 (6th ed. 2011).
171. See Floyd Norris, A Year of Chaos in Finance, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2008, at B1 (calling
2008 “the year the financial system stopped working”).
172. Assénagon Asset Mgmt. S.A. v. Irish Bank Resolution Corp., [2012] EWHC (Ch) 2090,
[19] (Eng.). Much of a bank’s assets are the loans that it extends; hence, the number comes with
a good amount of risk. See Emil Lee, Understanding a Bank’s Balance Sheet, MOTLEY FOOL
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bank faced a liquidity crisis because of its heavy investment in real
173
174
estate. Fearing systemic risk due to Anglo Irish’s collapse, the
Irish government instituted a number of steps to stem the collapse’s
175
The government began by
effect on the broader economy.
providing guarantees for the most troubled liabilities, including the
bonds eventually purchased by Assénagon, and then by proceeding to
176
nationalize Anglo Irish in January 2009.
The Irish government had spent nearly €23 billion propping up
Anglo Irish before it announced its plan for “appropriate burden
177
sharing” by the bank’s bondholders. The program’s aim was for the
government to lower its future costs to operate the bank by having
178
Anglo Irish’s bondholders agree to lower bond payments, and the
plan was to accomplish reduction of outlays through an exchange
179
offer paired with an exit consent. The extraordinary resolution
presented for a vote was to create an issuer right to redeem the old
180
bonds at 0.001 percent of their face value. The mechanism to create
this right was that the bondholders signed over their proxy votes to
IBRC, which IBRC would exercise on their behalf at the physical
181
bondholder meeting. Assénagon did not accept the offer or attend
the bondholder meeting, but more than 92 percent of bondholders
182
Because the extraordinary resolutions bound all
agreed.
bondholders whether they voted or not, Anglo Irish exercised its
183
newly created redemption right on November 30, 2010. For the
firm’s €17 million in face value bonds, for which it had paid around
184
€6.8 million, Assénagon received €170.

(Jan. 5, 2007), http://www.fool.com/investing/general/2007/01/05/understanding-a-banksbalance-sheet.aspx (acknowledging that “[l]oans represent the majority of a bank’s assets” and
“come with risk”).
173. Assénagon, [2012] EWHC (Ch) 2090, [19].
174. See id. (noting the bank’s “systemic importance” to the Irish economy).
175. Id.
176. Id. [19]–[21].
177. Id. [25], [27].
178. Under the burden-sharing program, bondholders were to agree to an 80 percent
reduction in bond payments, or roughly 20 percent of the bonds’ face value. Id. [30]. It was
agreed that the reduction equaled what was then the bonds’ market value. Id. [36].
179. See id. [29]–[38] (outlining the details of the Irish government’s exchange offer).
180. Id. [32].
181. Id. [33].
182. Id. [36].
183. Id. [36]–[37].
184. Id. [37].
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Perhaps unsurprisingly, Assénagon sued, challenging the validity
of the exchange itself in the Chancery Division of the High Court of
Justice of England and Wales. Assénagon advanced three separate
claims: First, the resolution conferred an unlawful power of
185
expropriation to the Irish government. Second, the bank, not the
bondholders, held the notes at the time of the vote, which technically
186
Third, the
violated the bond’s disenfranchisement provision.
resolution was an abuse of power by the majority of bondholders
187
against the minority.
For claim one, Assénagon’s theory was that the exchange offer
constituted expropriation because the payout was so significantly
188
reduced relative to the bonds’ face value. The expropriation claim
carried two questions: a question of outcomes and a separate question
of processes. On the outcomes question, though courts are generally
189
reluctant to appraise economic values, the court seemed willing to
side with Assénagon that the nominal amount of the payout was
190
equivalent to expropriation. The dispositive question, instead, was
one of processes. In other words, the right of redemption created by a
vote of the bondholders was what enabled the nominal amount of the
191
payout. For that reason, the payout, albeit jaw-droppingly low, was
not grounds for judicial scrutiny; rather, it was the process that
provided for the government to effect the low payout that should
192
have been legally determinative. Hence, on this claim, the court
193
found in favor of Anglo Irish.
The next two claims, however, proved problematic for the bank.
For claim two, Assénagon’s argument was that the process of proxy
194
voting violated the bond’s disenfranchisement provision. Anglo
Irish’s notes prohibited the bank from “vot[ing] at any meeting in

185. Id. [39].
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 79 (1981) (“If the requirement of
consideration is met, there is no additional requirement of . . . equivalence in the values
exchanged. . . .”).
190. Assénagon, [2012] EWHC (Ch) 2090, [54] (noting that the plaintiff made a “powerful
submission” when arguing that an English statute would not permit so low of a payout).
191. Id.
192. Id. [52].
193. Id. [87].
194. Id. [57].
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195

respect of Notes beneficially held by it or for its account.” Generally
speaking, the purpose of such provisions is to constrain the possibility
196
of vote manipulation and to promote fair dealing. The court seized
upon the phrase “at any meeting.” Under the court’s reasoning, when
the bondholders committed their proxy votes in favor of the
197
extraordinary resolution, they were voting before the meeting.
Hence, the bank held the notes at the meeting, thus violating the
198
literal application of the contract’s language.
In the court’s opinion, claim two—the disenfranchisement
199
claim—was sufficient to decide the case for Assénagon. But,
200
because of claim three’s “wide importance [to] the bond market”
(the alleged abuse of power by the majority of bondholders against
the minority), the court went on to discuss this claim. As a threshold
matter, the court emphasized that majorities are given the power to
201
bind minorities only for the benefit of the entire class of investors.
Over time, this principle was extended from partners in an enterprise
202
203
to shareholders, and later from shareholders to bondholders. In all
contexts, though, the power to bind minorities comes from the
company itself, reinforcing why that power must be directed in good
204
faith for the benefit of the company’s interest holders.
Then, importantly, the court applied the bondholder’s majority
power to bind minorities laterally, finding that a contract governing a
relationship between borrower and lender also establishes duties
205
among the lenders themselves. When the court applied these
principles to the facts of Assénagon, it deemed impossible the
conclusion that the exchange package was directed for the benefit of
206
the entire class of bondholders. The “correct [legal] question,” then,
195. Id. [16].
196. E.g., Michael Bradley & G. Mitu Gulati, Collective Action Clauses for the Eurozone:
An Empirical Analysis 38–39 (Mar. 28, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1948534.
197. Assénagon, [2012] EWHC (Ch) 2090, [19].
198. Id.
199. Id. [69].
200. Id.
201. Id. [41].
202. Id. [42].
203. Id. [43].
204. Id. [44].
205. Id. [45] (citing Redwood Masterfund Ltd. v. TD Bank Europe Ltd., [2002] EWHC (Ch)
2703, [91]–[92], [2006] 1 B.C.L.C. 149, 175 (Eng.)).
206. Id. [71].
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was whether a majority should be able to “lend its aid” to
207
expropriation. The court found that the majority did precisely this, a
conclusion at variance with the justifications by which majorities are
able to bind minorities and, therefore, a breach of the good faith duty
208
among creditors. “[O]ppression of a minority is of the essence of
exit consents of this kind, and it is precisely that at which the
principles restraining the abusive exercise of powers to bind
209
minorities are aimed.”
Hence, the court deemed the Irish
government’s use of the exit consent in the burden-sharing program
210
to be unlawful.
IV. GLOSSES ON ASSÉNAGON
So is Assénagon simply a new wrinkle in the law of exit consents,
or does it signal the beginning of their end in the international bond
markets? Although many immediate reactions to the case suggested
211
that it is the latter, this Note argues that Assénagon is more properly
the former. As one writer put it, when describing the duties in
another financial relationship, judicial opinions are akin to data
212
points, each one shaping the direction market participants take.
With Assénagon, the problem for the legal observer—whether an
academic, a practitioner, a bond issuer, or a bond investor—is that the
case could represent one of several data points, each suggesting
different directions. This Part aggregates those data points by offering
three different, but hardly mutually exclusive, interpretations of
Assénagon. The analysis proceeds to Part V, which proposes a single
207. Id. [84].
208. Id. [85].
209. Id. [86].
210. Id. [87].
211. See, e.g., Joseph Cotterill, More on Those Endangered Exit Consents, FT ALPHAVILLE
(July 31, 2012, 7:38 P.M.), http://ftalphaville.ft.com/2012/07/31/1102671/more-on-thoseendangered-exit-consents (“Mr. Justice Briggs didn’t merely take a technical potshot at exit
consents. He laid a depth charge . . . .”); Gelpern, supra note 30 (noting that “this decision takes
away a major source of flexibility” and “is a really big deal”); Levine, supra note 38 (“U.S.
courts have allowed [the exit consent] for 25 years, so it’s become standard. . . . Until today.”).
212. Emily D. Johnson, Note, The Fiduciary Duty in Mutual Fund Excessive Fee Cases: Ripe
for Reexamination, 59 DUKE L.J. 145, 173 (2009); see also Developments in English Law:
Chancery Division of High Court Overturns Exit Consent, SIMPSON THACHER 1 (Aug. 3, 2012),
http://www.stblaw.com/google_file.cfm?TrackedFile=4B46116603DBECD896B179&TrackedFo
lder=585C1D235281AED9B6A07D5F9F9478AB5A90188899 (arguing that the ruling “calls into
question the continued efficacy of established restructuring techniques that have used exit
consents as a core mechanic and introduces significant uncertainty into the English law
governed bond market”).
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direction forward by arguing for a transatlantic standard for exit
consents that combines the most sensible features of each
interpretation.
A. First Gloss: Assénagon Stands for Careful Contracting
Bonds are contracts, and judicial contract analysis begins with a
213
contract’s express terms. When one party’s conduct violates those
express terms, a breach of contract exists, against which the
214
nonbreaching party may make a claim and succeed in court. In
Assénagon, the structure of the exit consent vote by proxy violated
the contract’s express term that such votes be conducted “at [a
215
216
physical] meeting.” That breach was sufficient to decide the case,
and, hence, for the issuer contemplating an exit consent, Assénagon
stands for carefully aligning the exit consent’s process with the letter
of the contract, or, if possible, drafting the contract to provide for the
process by which the issuer envisions obtaining an exit consent.
The simple appeal of this interpretation is that it also borders on
being a truism: bonds are contracts, and contracts mean what they
say. Moreover, some features of the bond market render this
interpretation especially insightful. The first feature is the character
of the parties. In the bond context, they are almost always
217
sophisticated, which carries the presumption that they understand
the processes that follow a default in payment or precede a possible
218
default. Accordingly, bond issuers should use care in the provisions
they select, knowing bondholders will be aware of differences in
language.
Complementing this first feature—namely, that sophisticated
parties have the ability to craft bond contracts as they wish—is the
second feature, which is that they actually do craft bond contracts
213. See, e.g., Assénagon, [2012] EWHC (Ch) 2090, [56]–[68] (discussing the manner in
which IBRC’s actions conflicted with the language of its indentures).
214. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (1981) (defining a contract as “a
promise or a set of promises for the breach of which the law gives a remedy, or the performance
of which the law in some way recognizes as a duty”).
215. Assénagon, [2012] EWHC (Ch) 2090, [62].
216. See id. [69] (“My conclusions [on the breach of express terms] are sufficient to
determine this case in favour of the claimant.”).
217. See id. [10] (claiming that the parties in the Anglo Irish case were, for the most part, “at
the time of the exchange offer, sophisticated professional investors”).
218. See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1504, 1509 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)
(deeming sophisticated investors well aware of contract terms, as they likely “review [the terms]
carefully before lending hundreds of millions of dollars to any company”).

DRAKE IN PP (FLIP) (DO NOT DELETE)

1616

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

3/18/2014 1:11 PM

[Vol. 63:1589

carefully. The literature on modification, or collective-action, clauses
is vast, revealing a complex history and a multitude of variations
across the provisions’ several discrete aspects. Modern practice
exhibits this variation specifically on the meeting requirements. Some
219
bonds explicitly require a meeting to modify the agreement; for
220
others, a written resolution suffices. In Assénagon, the attention
given to the phrase “at any meeting” may come across as
221
formalistic, but other recent, high-profile bond litigation shows that
222
courts on both sides of the Atlantic use this literalist approach.
Although the preceding analysis establishes two doctrinal
justifications for accepting the “at any meeting” language at face
value, market practice supplies a separate reason for a meeting
requirement. Often, distressed bonds are for significant sums of
money—each issue may be worth well more than half a billion
dollars—which require a group of banks with broad customer bases to
223
raise all of the funds. The influence of the institutional investor does
mean that bondholders have a reasonable idea of the identity of the
224
other bondholders. Still, though bondholder identities may be
ascertainable, they are not static; publicly traded bonds may change
225
hands several times beyond the point of the initial offering. A
meeting requirement gives a forum to cut through the uncertain
identities so that the bondholders or their representatives may
physically identify each other.
Of course, careful contracting only works as an explanation to
the extent that the parties have a mutual understanding of the same
226
language. The problem, as specifically applied to Assénagon’s facts,
is that it is unclear whether the investors would have known the
disenfranchisement provision was a part of the deal. Although the

219. See Anglo Irish Bank Corp., PLC, supra note 71, ¶ 14(i), at 46 (describing a meeting in
the modification clause).
220. See Republic of Ecuador, supra note 73, at 95 (allowing for a written resolution).
221. Assénagon, [2012] EWHC (Ch) 2090, [62].
222. See NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Arg., 699 F.3d 246, 258–59 (2d Cir. 2012)
(applying a literal reading to the phrase “pari passu” within sovereign bond contracts).
223. BREALEY, ET AL., supra note 40, at 625–26.
224. See Kahan, supra note 18, at 1060 (“The market for corporate bonds is heavily
dominated by institutional investors.”).
225. Steven L. Schwarcz & Gregory M. Sergi, Bond Defaults and the Dilemma of the
Indenture Trustee, 59 ALA. L. REV. 1037, 1038 (2008).
226. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 5(1) (1981) (“A term of a promise or
agreement is that portion of the intention or assent manifested which relates to a particular
matter.”).
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contract language of a bond that actually binds the parties is the
indenture, the language of the indenture is supposed to correspond to
the prospectus, the carefully crafted legal document that describes the
legal features. Here, the prospectus for the notes that were exchanged
does not correspond with the language the court cites. In U.S.
securities practice, the omission might warrant action by the
Securities and Exchange Commission for material deviation between
227
the offering document and the actual contract. This fact, rather,
stands for the broader principle that careful contract construction
only goes as far as the expectations that the contracting parties share
based upon the common language.
B. Second Gloss: Assénagon Merely Creates TIA-Like Protections
After discussing “bespoke” contract provisions—those agreed
upon specifically by the parties—the High Court went on to discuss
228
provisions read into contracts by force of statute. As an example,
229
the High Court mentioned the operation of the TIA under U.S. law.
A U.S. court likely would not have reached the good faith issue when
the modification of the redemption amount in this manner would
230
seem to violate TIA Section 316(b). Under this gloss, the High
Court’s use of the TIA is purposive, and Assénagon, therefore, simply
creates something like the TIA for bonds governed by English law.
This gloss, too, has the appeal of being intuitively accurate, but it
overlooks the distinction between the contractual term being changed
and the process by which it is changed. The redemption amount is not
legally determinative under Assénagon or Katz. Rather, the TIA says
only that one needs a unanimous vote to change a payment term,
which Assénagon seems to imply in its discussion of minority
231
oppression. The literal reading of the TIA is that it puts payment
terms off-limits for modification, but a more purposive reading—
which is in line with what the Assénagon court found—is that the TIA
says no process that results in a change to a payment term is valid
227. Query whether an investor would actually sue because the disenfranchisement
provision makes the bond stronger from his perspective.
228. See Assénagon Asset Mgmt. S.A. v. Irish Bank Resolution Corp., [2012] EWHC (Ch)
2090, [48]–[49] (Eng.).
229. Id. [49].
230. Cf. Trust Indenture Act of 1939 § 316(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77ppp(a) (2012) (forbidding
changes to payment terms without unanimous consent of bondholders).
231. See Assénagon, [2012] EWHC (Ch) 2090, [53]–[54] (discussing the value of preserving
the minority of bondholders against the majority taking its remuneration).
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232

unless it has unanimous consent. This reading of the TIA finds more
support in the opinion’s discussion of intercreditor duties.
C. Third Gloss: Assénagon Creates a Lateral Good Faith Duty
In the context of an exit consent, a breach of the good faith duty
exists when the issuer constructs an exchange offer that is wrongfully
233
coercive. To this principle, Assénagon adds that a breach of the
good faith duty also exists when a majority of the bondholders
234
participate in the vote that creates the wrongfully coercive situation.
Or does it? Assénagon’s discussion of the lateral good faith duty is
when the language is at its most forceful. Yet it also comes with the
proviso that the preceding discussion on disenfranchisement was
235
enough to decide the case. This suggests that what follows (that is,
the discussion of the lateral good faith duty) is dicta—strong and
ringing language to be sure, but of no legal consequence.
Of course, the observer cannot look away from the import of this
language on the lateral good faith duty for two reasons. First, the
court couches its discussion in the alternative, offering its rationales in
anticipation that an appeals court might overturn its application of
236
the contract’s language. Second, and perhaps more importantly, the
case reaches fundamental questions of contract law, questions of
237
parties involved, default and mandatory rules, and implied duties.
Even if this is not the correct interpretation of Assénagon, because of
the questions it raises and the interest it has received, it merits
attention. Whether the standards this interpretation implies are the
correct standards, however, spawns another discussion altogether.
V. THE RISE OF THE EXIT CONSENT: TOWARD A TRANSATLANTIC
STANDARD
Debt markets demand certainty. Among the most salient
criticisms of using junk bonds to fund leveraged buyouts was that

232. See Trust Indenture Act § 316(a).
233. Katz v. Oak Indus. Inc., 508 A.2d 837, 879–80 (Del. Ch. 1986).
234. Assénagon, [2012] EWHC (Ch) 2090, [84]–[85] (establishing that the exit consent
depends upon action by a majority of bondholders and that it is no defense to say it is done at
the issuer’s invitation).
235. Id. [69].
236. See id. (addressing the issue on the hypothesis that the disenfranchisement claim does
not apply).
237. See id. (reaching the issue also because of its broad importance to the bond market).
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such use turned the bond into a fundamentally different investment
238
vehicle. Further, assurances of certainty are especially necessary in
the context of sovereign debt, as the international character of the
239
parties already injects an unhelpful element of instability. In an
environment in which global finances are in flux, legal principles
ought to provide assurance to world markets.
For markets in search of certainty, Assénagon was a “depth
240
charge” against the exit consent. Far from a “technical potshot,” the
case goes to the foundation of the relationships inherent in contracts
241
generally and transnational bonds specifically. It is this relational
focus—and its position as precedent given IBRC’s dropped appeal—
242
that has stirred academics and practitioners to attention. But, both
the court and its observers should save their concern for another case.
Assénagon is an example of difficult facts making for bad law,
but it need not be this way. Especially given the tumult in modern
sovereign-debt markets, it is imperative that bond issuances on either
side of the Atlantic have recognizable and familiar standards for
workouts. Bankruptcy is not an option for the sovereign debtors who
243
are most likely to use the exit consent. Even if the facts of each
default or near-default vary, parties on both sides of the bond
transaction should have consistent, clear expectations regarding the
manner in which their dispute will be settled.
A. The Rule of Katz Covers the Facts in Assénagon
A natural rejoinder to the plea for consistency and familiarity is
that, if those two criteria are paramount, then all New York law need
do is adopt Assénagon’s standards as they apply to exit consents. Yet
the problem with Assénagon is that it does not meaningfully add to
Katz, which embodied the expectations most parties had for the
process of exit consents. Similar expectations are apparent in a case

238. See Sloan, supra note 130 (arguing that use of bonds for leveraged buyouts effectively
converted the bonds into stocks).
239. See Odette Lineau, Who Is the “Sovereign” in Sovereign Debt?: Reinterpreting a Rule of
Law Framework from the Early Twentieth Century, 33 YALE J. INT’L L. 63, 66 (2008) (providing
that “a purely statist approach to sovereignty,” which “assumes the continuity of sovereign
obligations across successive regimes and therefore mandates the payment of all debt,” is vital
to “the stability and certainty required for cross-border lending”).
240. Cotterill, supra note 211.
241. Id.
242. E.g., Gelpern, supra note 30.
243. See supra notes 49–60 and accompanying text.
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that the Assénagon court approvingly cited, Azevedo v. Imcopa
244
There, a Brazilian soybean producer sought to
Importação.
restructure its debt and offered “consent payments” to bondholders
245
voting in favor of the change. The Azevedo court found no
246
impropriety, and, to buttress its finding, it discussed the Kass
247
decision. The careful observer can draw a few implications from this
fact. For one, the Assénagon court’s disapproval of Katz is at least
somewhat mitigated when, elsewhere, the same court, albeit a
different subdivision of that court, approves of another decision for
which Katz was a necessary antecedent. More fundamentally, the
inclusion of Azevedo suggests that, just as Katz and Kass have been
read together, so too can Azevedo and Assénagon be understood as
twin (and similarly alliterative) pillars of English jurisprudence on
exit consents. In this way, viewed as a continuation of an earlier case,
Assénagon does not mark the exit consent’s death knell, but rather its
outer limit.
Perhaps the greatest irony of Assénagon is that, although the
court wrote that it refused to apply Katz, its reasoning effectively
extended Katz. In Katz, the ultimate test is whether a court can deem
an exchange to be wrongfully coercive, which a court appraises by
ascertaining whether the contract’s original parties would have
forbidden the exchange had they possessed the foresight to imagine
248
it. In U.S. practice, the question is moot because the TIA prohibits
such modifications to core payment terms without the unanimous
249
consent of bondholders. The unanimity requirement here presumes
that the modification is being undertaken for the benefit of the entire
class of bondholders.
Even assuming a contract regime in which unanimity is not
required for lowering a payment term, it is difficult to envision a
scenario in which lowering the payment ratio to 0.001 percent of face
value would not be deemed wrongfully coercive. Simply put,
Assénagon could fit easily with Kass among the progeny of Katz. As a
corollary, Assénagon could stand as an extension of Katz, illustrating
244. Azevedo v. Imcopa Importação, [2012] EWHC 1849 (Comm.).
245. Id. [2]–[13].
246. Id. [61].
247. Id. [55]–[59]; see infra Part II.B.1.
248. See supra Part II.B.1.
249. See Buchheit & Gulati, supra note 80, at 1335 (explaining that, in the United States,
changes to the payment terms of sovereign bonds cannot be made without the unanimous
consent of the bondholders).

DRAKE IN PP (FLIP) (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

3/18/2014 1:11 PM

THE FALL AND RISE OF THE EXIT CONSENT

1621

the durability of the good faith rule. It need not stand alone as a
refutation of Katz, especially given the consequences for the broader
sovereign debt markets.
B. The Lateral Good Faith Duty Is Inapt in Modern Debt Markets
The creation of a lateral good faith duty to avoid wrongful
coercion extends Katz in an unnecessary way. More generally, it
confounds the expectations of parties to a bond agreement. Although
bonds are contracts, the modern understanding of many of their
250
default and mandatory rules comes from securities practice. This is
different from a loan; indeed, borrowers often choose bond financing
251
because they want to avoid a bank loan. The bonds in Assénagon
would have a “presumption” of being securities, and upon further
review, evince the characteristics that suggest a longer-term
252
relationship than a loan. The securities precedent here is persuasive
rather than determinative because it applies only to U.S. law;
however, it does demonstrate the expectations that professionals in
this field bring to different investments. Hence, the foundational
understandings of securities are illustrative of the expectations that
bondholders have when entering into the agreements.
In issuer transactions, the focus of U.S. law is upon the
distribution of the securities themselves, and thus focuses on the
253
transaction. Claims in this sphere, therefore, follow along the
254
distribution channels from purchasers up to issuers, and, although
the transactional focus does not establish contractual duties, that
focus is at least persuasive evidence of the way in which securities
purchasers view the relationship.
Assénagon turns that relationship on its side and would have
securities purchasers looking to other purchasers for claims. In some
instances—when a conflict of interest arises or the underlying
investment vehicle is different—there is justification for the lateral

250. See, e.g., Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 67 (1990) (classifying securities under
the “family resemblance” test).
251. See supra Part I.A.
252. Compare Reves, 494 U.S. at 67–69 (describing securities as being long-term due to their
“fundamental essence” as an investment), with Assénagon Asset Mgmt. S.A. v. Irish Bank
Resolution Corp., [2012] EWHC (Ch) 2090, [9] (Eng.) (listing the bond’s due date as giving a
long-term maturity).
253. JAMES D. COX, ROBERT W. HILLMAN & DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, SECURITIES
REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 1–2 (6th ed. 2009).
254. Id.
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approach, but Assénagon’s facts do not align with these exceptions.
Under New York law, Hackettstown comes closest to finding a
255
relationship among creditors that would imply a good faith duty.
Yet that case’s utility is limited as to Assénagon specifically because
Hackettstown does not establish a lateral good faith duty, but rather
deals with the conflict of interest that exists when a creditor is also a
256
principal shareholder. As scholars Lee Buchheit and Mitu Gulati
point out, TIA § 316(a) obviates this concern when it prohibits an
obligor or someone controlled by the obligor from changing the terms
257
of the bond. So too did Anglo Irish’s debentures do away with this
concern when they disenfranchised the issuer from voting on bonds
258
held for its own account. With Hackettstown as precedent, the
lateral good faith duty is a solution to a problem that no longer exists.
Of modern precedents that Assénagon cites, Redwood Masterfund,
259
Ltd. v. TD Bank Europe Ltd. is most on point—but it too has
limited utility. In Redwood, a project-finance case, the underlying
transaction differed in fundamental ways from that of the transaction
260
in Assénagon. So, though illustrative and perhaps persuasive, a
project-finance precedent should not be controlling in an
261
international debt-finance case.
The modern bond market gives little foundation for creating a
lateral good faith duty. One reason supporting a modification clause’s
meeting requirement is that there is an active secondary market for
publicly traded bonds, so the individual bondholders are constantly in
255. See supra Part II.B.2.
256. Hackettstown Nat’l Bank v. D.G. Yuengling Brewing Co., 74 F. 110, 112 (2d Cir. 1896).
257. Buchheit & Gulati, supra note 58, at 76.
258. Assénagon Asset Mgmt. S.A. v. Irish Bank Resolution Corp., [2012] EWHC (Ch) 2090,
[16] (Eng.).
259. Redwood Masterfund, Ltd. v. TD Bank Eur. Ltd., [2002] EWHC (Ch) 2703, [2006] 1
B.C.L.C. 149.
260. In Redwood, the underlying transaction was a syndicated loan agreement, id. [1]–[3],
[2006] 1 B.C.L.C. at 151–52, whereas in Assénagon, the underlying transaction was one of
bondholder note exchanges, Assénagon [2012] EWHC 2090 [1].
261. The specifics of project finance are well beyond the scope of this Note. It should suffice
to say that, in project finance, there is a very specific funding object—such as building a bridge
or a power plant, or excavating a mine—and lenders receive payout from the project itself.
Therefore, the lenders draft contracts very specifically to maintain constant communication as
between themselves and the borrower, and among themselves to coordinate when sums of
money will be necessary and how the project is progressing. Hence, the implied duty of good
faith probably owes as much to these considerations as to any black-letter doctrine. See
GRAHAM D. VINTER, PROJECT FINANCE: A LEGAL GUIDE xix (3d ed. 2006) (outlining private
sponsor objectives in entering a project and the intricacies within each objective that would
clearly necessitate careful contracting and constant communication and trust between parties).
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262

flux. It is difficult to impose duties between the bondholders when
that class is changing. Similarly, even the identities of the parties may
263
change.
Assénagon, for example, is now known as XAIA
264
Investment. The only anchor in these contractual relationships is
the identity of the issuer. This is who bondholders receive
information from, and this is who constructs the exchange offer to
265
begin with. This relationship between bond issuer and bondholder
girds the bond from the beginning. Hence, it is this relationship—and
this relationship alone—that should supply duties inherent in the
bond.
However incorrectly applied the lateral standard may be, it is at
least well-intentioned. The proper construction of the exit consent
standard would keep those intentions but apply them along the
understood lines of contract duties. Going forward, bond issuers
considering an exchange can probably avoid legal scrutiny when their
actions are consistent with the contract’s language. They can probably
further insulate themselves when their offers are beyond reproach
under the standards of Katz. Beyond that, any conceptions of duties
owed by the bondholders may be instructive, but they should not be
legally determinative.
CONCLUSION
Amid the economic tumult of the late aughts, scholars Carmen
Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff proposed the this-time-is-different
266
theory of financial markets. The theory’s name was tongue-incheek, as its gist was that financial turmoil occurs when market actors
hubristically assume that “financial crises are things that happen to
other people in other countries at other times . . . . We [the modern
market actors] are doing things better, . . . we have learned from our
267
past mistakes.” This Note argues that the same words of caution
apply to the legal innovations tailored to that tumult. True innovation
262. See Schwarcz & Sergi, supra note 225, at 1037–38 (explaining that the collective-action
issue that often occurs with publicly traded bonds is due to bondholders’ inability to act “as a
cohesive group” when comparably small investments “minimiz[e] [the] economic incentive to
take action or cooperate”).
263. Id. at 1038.
264. Bradley, supra note 29.
265. See Schwarcz & Sergi, supra note 225, at 1039 (describing the issuer and indenture
language as being the binding force of a bond through indenture trustees).
266. REINHART & ROGOFF, supra note 36, at 1.
267. Id.
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is rare and traditional doctrines are as apt for modern economic
shocks as they were for their antecedents. As it relates to the exit
consent, the rule of Katz resolves the good faith duty in a manner that
is practical, familiar, and satisfying. Further, creating a transatlantic
standard on exit consents by repudiating Katz will not resolve Anglo
268
Irish’s legal problems, which are ongoing and continue to stir
269
controversy.
270
Though Ireland’s economic recovery may be in sight, the
resolution of future, unforeseen economic crises will rest upon
interpretation of this remarkable case, Assénagon. Against a
background of market paradigms influx, courts should adapt rather
than upend the implicated legal paradigms. Buttressing fundamental
legal principles would do much in the way of bolstering a stronger,
steadier macroeconomy.

268. Mary Carolan, Anglo Irish Bank Criminal Cases Could Run for Several Years, High
Court Told, IRISH TIMES (Jan. 14, 2014, 6:36 AM), http://www.irishtimes.com/business/sectors/
financial-services/anglo-irish-bank-criminal-cases-could-run-for-several-years-high-court-told1.1653989.
269. E.g., Floyd Norris, In Ireland, Dire Echoes of a Bailout Gone Awry, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 4,
2013, at B1.
270. Eamon Quinn, Irish Central Bank Sees Start of Recovery; Bank of Ireland Says Too
Early To Say Crisis Is Over, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 29, 2014, 7:00 AM), http://online.wsj.com/news/
articles/SB10001424052702304428004579350252187548142.

